Liberman to 'Post': Israel's overconfidence led to Hamas's massacre

In 2016, Avigdor Liberman warned that Hamas was building up terror capabilities and called for a more aggressive policy against the extremist group. 

“The question is what your conclusions are [resulting] from the same information,” he says. He’s discussing the importance of fresh ideas when approaching information related to intelligence and security issues. This is particularly crucial now in the wake of the Hamas attack on October 7 that led to the massacre of 1,400 people in Israel. 

Liberman warned seven years ago that Hamas was building up capabilities and planning a surprise attack using hundreds of terrorists to try to kill and kidnap Israelis.

At his office in the Knesset, the longtime leader of the Yisrael Beytenu party casts his gaze backward, then discusses the future. 

Liberman speaks clearly, with confidence and clarity. He wears a crisp white dress shirt. He understands politics and Israel, having been in these halls for decades. He has also worked closely with Benjamin Netanyahu since the 1990s.

In 2016, Liberman was defense minister. At the time, he saw information relating to Hamas threats. 

“I joined the Netanyahu-led government in May 2016; already by December 2016, I presented him with... I handed him a paper that I wrote with my advisers describing the scenario we saw on October 7, 2023. I also gave it to [IDF] chief of staff Gadi Eizenkot. I submitted this document to the cabinet in December 2016.”

He says, “My conclusion in 2016 was completely opposite from that of our entire military establishment, despite their experience and professionalism. When people serve many years in the same place, they don’t have the capacity for fresh approaches.” 

IN AN interview with the Magazine, Liberman does not dwell on the past, however. He wants a strong future for Israel, and he wants to see Hamas defeated, its leaders targeted, and Israel take back the initiative. 

He also wants to stress how important it is to ask the right questions and draw the right conclusions. 

“I think it was clear to me that such a radical religious jihadist movement [Hamas] is a real threat to our future and existence – and in our 2009 coalition agreement, at our insistence, one of the main clauses was to eliminate Hamas’ rule in Gaza.” Hamas came to power in Gaza in the wake of Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 

Liberman opposed the disengagement and was dismissed from the cabinet by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon.

Hamas came to power in Gaza and began firing rockets at Israel. It also attacked Israel in 2006, kidnapping Gilad Schalit that June. At the time, the saga of trying to get Schalit released was difficult for Israel. 

Yahya Sinwar – the terrorist leading Hamas in Gaza, who planned the October massacre – was released in 2011 in the Schalit deal. Liberman had opposed the release of the Hamas prisoners in the deal. 

By the time Liberman became defense minister, Israel had already entered into a kind of conception regarding Hamas rule in Gaza. Dividing the Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza meant that Hamas would remain in Gaza. It received funds from Qatar and continued to attack Israel. 

There was a war in 2009, and then an air campaign against Hamas in 2012, then a 50-day war in Gaza in 2014, designed to neutralize the Hamas tunnel threat. More wars came and went, and Hamas rocket fire grew and the range of the rockets increased. 

“It was impossible to convince Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the military and political leaders that Hamas was a real threat. There was an arrogance and hubris... it was impossible [for them to see] that they had made a mistake and that someone had an opinion different to the official line. They were so arrogant, it was mission impossible to convince them,” recalls Liberman. 

IT’S WORTH remembering now that back in 2016, Syria was in the midst of a civil war. Some of the arms flow for Hamas had been cut off when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in Egypt. In 2015, Egypt flooded tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt, which Hamas used for smuggling. 

At the time, Israel was focusing on threats in the North, including increased Iranian entrenchment in Syria. 

In November 2018, Hamas increased its attacks, launching 400 rockets at Israel in two days. Israel agreed to a ceasefire.

“After the Hamas attacks in November 2018, we had a cabinet meeting and I demanded a very tough response and wide operation against Hamas in Gaza,” recounts Liberman. “Of course, Netanyahu and Eizenkot preferred to do something in the North as an excuse not to do something in the South, and at the end of the day the final decision was a ceasefire.” 

He also says the decision was made to enable the transfer of $10 million in cash to Hamas in Gaza. 

“On November 14, I resigned from my position as defense minister, explaining that a ceasefire with Hamas and the decision to transfer the Qatari money to Hamas in Gaza were capitulations to terror. [I said at the time that] they were buying some quiet in the short term but sacrificing our security in the long term.” 

Unfortunately, Liberman says, the leadership ignored his warnings and Israel got momentary calm and quiet – but national security was sacrificed in the long term. 

His resignation in 2018 from Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition led to a shakeup of the political system. 

2018 was an important year. It was when Hamas launched massive riots along the border fence in the spring. US president Donald Trump opened the US Embassy in Jerusalem that May. In addition, 2018 was the year the Syrian regime returned to the Golan border and Iran began to increase its trafficking of weapons via Syria to Hezbollah. 

However, Israel entered a political crisis in 2019 as elections were called. 

Over the next two years, there were numerous elections until Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett formed a government in 2021, with Liberman as one of their many coalition partners. He became finance minister. 

The government fell a year later, and Netanyahu returned to power. 

At this point, Netanyahu embarked on a judicial reform crusade and extremist threats grew in the West Bank, from Hezbollah in Lebanon, and from Hamas in Gaza. 

What happened over the last weeks of September 2023 and the build-up to the October 7 attack? 

For about 12 days we watched the Hamas violence on our border, with some firing into our territory; shooting with guns; real violence on the fence. After 12 days, the decision was made to increase the number of workers permitted into Israel from Gaza from 18,000 to 30,000 and to increase monthly payments to Hamas from $10 to $18 million.

For Hamas it was a signal; what they were doing was a dress rehearsal before they made the final decision to attack us. And this was an approach of capitulation, a defeatist approach to contain Hamas. Netanyahu’s approach was containment, and the result was that after their violence came the atrocities on October 7. 

You visited the Gaza periphery with Eshkol Regional Council head Gadi Yarkoni and saw a lack of IDF forces on the border, is that correct? 

I asked, ‘Where are the soldiers?’ We didn’t see any soldiers. We made a statement about this on video. I said in the video that it’s crazy what is happening here, we are in bad shape. Yarkoni said that during the 12 days [of Hamas’s agitation on the border], he didn’t receive any calls, either from the prime minister or from the defense minister to say anyone would visit them [the border communities]. Not a single MK visited the regional council on the Gaza periphery.

We now know how lightly defended the Gaza border was. 

Hamas members on motorcycles and in trucks attacked the border in waves, hang-gliding into the Supernova festival. They struck at 29 points along the hi-tech border fence, attacking IDF posts and breaking through to the kibbutzim that line the border. Golani battalions on the border were overwhelmed and suffered heavy losses. Soldiers in observation posts had no defenses as they watched the enemy swarm over. 

When you were defense minister, how many battalions and defense forces were on the border?

It was a really strong force. When they began with the riots [the so-called Great Return March, the Hamas-orchestrated riots in the spring of 2018], the reaction was tough. In Haaretz, Amos Harel wrote that we were seeing a different approach to everything. The mood for many years among our leadership – political and military leadership – was defeatist; everything [was aimed] at containment. They said Hamas had no interest in escalation. 

[Liberman provides an example from the week before October 7. He notes that at the Sunday meeting, a week before October 7, the security establishment and the prime minister all repeated “like parrots” the idea that Hamas was deterred and had no interest in escalation.] 

How could they come to such an erroneous conclusion? 

They were so self-confident and arrogant in their opinions. They tried to disregard the facts. [Liberman points out examples of when countries were surprised by invasion in the past such as before the Yom Kippur War, before World War II, before Operation Barbarossa – the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union – and before 9/11.] The world had enough intelligence [in each case]. 

The question is what are your conclusions from the same information? My conclusion in 2016 was completely opposite to our whole military establishment, despite their experience and professionalism. When people serve many years in the same place, they don’t have the capacity for fresh perspectives. 

What would you have done differently on October 7? 

If I had been defense minister, on that day I would have submitted my resignation. It’s impossible not to take responsibility for this disaster... [the prime minister has tried to blame the protesters and others] but the trigger was his capitulation and defeatist position.

What will Israel be like when the war is over?

Israel will be a different country, although Netanyahu will try to survive [politically]; it’s his main strategy. There will be another attempt from Netanyahu to destroy our society. 

The first was to ignore the Hamas threat, the second was the legal reforms, and the third is the attempt to prevent the establishment of a commission of inquiry. He speaks [only] about a government commission. And he will try to survive and continue to be prime minister. 

LIBERMAN RECALLS how, in 2006 in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu called on prime minister Ehud Olmert to resign. In January 2008, our own report in The Jerusalem Post noted that Netanyahu asserted, “Olmert refuses to take responsibility, to demonstrate personal honesty and leadership and to do what most of the public expect him to do,” adding that “the prime minister is emptying of content the concept of responsibility. The people of Israel know today that they are led by a prime minister who is not qualified or fit to lead them.” 

What about the other fronts Israel faces, such as constant attacks by Hezbollah, a terrorist group that doesn’t seem deterred? 

It’s terrible, but we have a very strong political card – the UN Security Council Resolution 1701... which was adopted by all members of the council, including China, Russia, and Qatar; and after them, the Lebanese government. According to the [resolution], it’s forbidden for even a single Hezbollah member to be stationed between the Litani River in Lebanon and our border, and presently we have thousands along our security fence on the northern border.

We see the same pattern of behavior as in the South; they carry out provocations every day on our border, and I think that whatever you saw in the South, the writing was on the wall in the North. Hezbollah had been waiting for the best timing for their side. Today we have 200,000 refugees displaced within Israel. I visited our northern border, and I didn’t see the inhabitants of the 24 villages [because they are empty]... they will not return if they see Hezbollah terrorists on the border. They saw what happened in the South. It’s impossible.

We need the initiative in our hands. Not to contain. Rather, if there is one small violation, we should be very strong and ready to operate. And the response should be strong and aggressive. 

And what about Yemen, where the Iran-backed Houthis continue to attack us? 

We should respond in our own time. But it’s impossible not to react to this attack.

And Gaza? 

It’s crucial to clarify from our side that we won’t supply any more electricity or water, and to close the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings. The crossings will be closed forever. What they need in Gaza will come from Egypt, through El Arish and Rafah. We made a very tough, disputed decision in 2005 for disengagement. 

Eliminate all their [Hamas] leaders [such as Mohammed Dief, Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar]. Those in Qatar and Lebanon are legitimate targets. All of them, including Abu Marzouk, Sinwar, and all the others. We will never accept that [Hamas commander] Salah Arouri will operate from Beirut, for instance; it doesn’t matter where they are living today, they are legitimate targets.

We should keep our options for freedom to operate there every day. It’s like in Judea and Samaria, when we think we should do something in Tulkarm or Jenin, we have our hands free to do it. The same should be done in the Gaza Strip. And create some buffer zone, around 2-3 k.m. along the border, and anyone who violates it should know they may be killed. 

What about the hostages being held in Gaza?

We must make a decision to release all the hostages by force. I don’t believe in deals with Hamas; they will cheat and claim some of the hostages are in the hands of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and some in the hands of other groups... I’m not sure they are able to deliver. It’s our obligation to release all the hostages. 

If Israel leaves Gaza, though, after defeating Hamas and taking out its leaders, won’t Hamas return? 

I’m not sure. We should put pressure on the Arab League. Their 22 countries should take responsibility for the Gaza Strip. I’m not ready to take any responsibility. 

Qatar has backed Hamas. Could it swoop into Gaza? 

No. I think that the members of the moderate Arab states understand what Qatar intends. In Egypt, they don’t allow [Qatari news outlet] Al Jazeera. I’m not sure that Saudi Arabia or Jordan or others – or Kuwait – are so happy to see the Muslim Brotherhood in power. [Note: Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Qatar has backed groups linked to the Brotherhood.] It should be the responsibility of the Arab League, and we must be stubborn, and clear, and tough on this position. If not, there will be anarchy in Gaza.

So what you propose is that Israel stop what you consider the policy of containment and capitulation. 

If we see new Hamas leaders, we should eliminate them with a free hand. If we see some new attempt to smuggle weapons or some attempt to create some new network of underground Gaza military positions, we should destroy it immediately. We should not tolerate 500 km. – or even 5 meters – of tunnels. 

The people of Kibbutz Kfar Aza used to help Gazans and embrace coexistence, yet after visiting the area where Hamas massacred and kidnapped many people, you said you believe that your view can now be embraced by those on the Left who might have opposed it. 

When I met them during our last meeting after October 7, they had shifted their views by 180 degrees. Today, our society and landscape are more willing to accept my position than in the past. At the end of the day, they see I was right.

What about Russia’s stance on Hamas, in which Moscow has not condemned the terrorism of October 7? 

For Russians, they have their interests and their main priority is the war in Ukraine, while we are part of the “West.” For them, it’s a global political interest; everything is related to their ties to Iran and North Korea; as with China and Taiwan. 

It’s a geopolitical situation. We are back to the Cold War. But even more bloodshed than during the Cold War.

That could be bad news if countries like Russia refuse to condemn terror. 

They are afraid. The recent event in Dagestan where there was an attempt to lynch Jewish people and Israeli citizens – and it was a threat to the Jewish people and Israelis. They understand very well that the next step will be against Russians. Radical Islam is more popular in the Caucasus and Central Asia and the brainwashing that comes from abroad. It’s a huge challenge for Russia. ■