Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump will meet in the Oval Office on Tuesday with Iran closer than ever to a nuclear weapon.
According to a report last week by Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Iran’s breakout time in November 2024 was a week or less – compared to 3.5 months in November 2020. Breakout time refers to the period it would take for Iran, once it decides to do so, to produce enough weapons-grade uranium – using its existing stockpile of enriched uranium and operational centrifuges – for a single bomb.
Also in November 2020, Iran had only enough weapons-grade uranium to produce two nuclear weapons. Today, that number stands at 16.
Despite this alarming picture, media attention in the lead-up to the Trump-Netanyahu meeting has focused elsewhere – on the Gaza hostage deal and whether a second stage is forthcoming; on the day after the Gaza war; on the possibility of advancing Saudi-Israeli normalization; and on Trump’s proposal for Jordan, Egypt, and possibly other Muslim countries to take in Gazan refugees.
These issues are urgent and, at the moment, more attention-grabbing. Netanyahu has been discussing Iran with successive US administrations for more than 15 years – the same debates over negotiations versus military action, how to negotiate, what to offer, what to expect from the Iranians, and what to do if talks fail. As a result, the Iranian dimension of the discussions takes up less space in the Israeli media landscape. It’s a case of “been there, done that” so many times that interest tends to wane.
It shouldn’t.
Formulating an Iran policy
The Trump administration is in the process of formulating its Iran policy, and Netanyahu’s visit at this early stage in the president’s second term affords him a golden opportunity to give his input. And Iran remains Israel’s number one threat and problem.
During his first term, Trump took a hard line on the Islamic Republic, withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), calling it a terrible deal, and implementing a policy of “maximum pressure” to isolate Tehran diplomatically and economically. While his administration still seeks to contain Iran’s regional influence and prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon, there have been early signs of shifts in tone and priorities.
These shifts may reflect internal divisions within the administration – between Iran hawks like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and isolationists like Vice President JD Vance, who said in October: “Our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran… this is where smart diplomacy really matters.”
Trump told reporters last week in the Oval Office that he hopes a resolution can be reached without an Israeli strike. “It would really be nice if that could be worked out without having to go that further step,” he said.
“Iran will hopefully make a deal, and if they don’t make a deal, that’s okay too.”
Trump’s first term was defined by fierce opposition to the JCPOA, a belief that maximum pressure – through sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports and financial sector – could force a change in Iranian behavior and by explicit threats of military action.
Those themes remain evident in the early days of his second term as well. But there is also a clearer openness to diplomacy as a preferred path.
As Trump said in his inaugural address: “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.”
In his talks with Trump, Netanyahu will seek to clarify the administration’s diplomatic approach. This is an opportunity for him to argue that recent Israeli successes against Hamas and Hezbollah make this the right moment to intensify pressure on Iran.
If Trump is serious about diplomacy, Netanyahu will want to understand what kind of deal the administration envisions – what it will demand of Iran and what concessions the US will be willing to make. He will also seek clarity on timelines, given Iran’s track record of prolonging talks while making quiet progress toward its nuclear goal.
And perhaps most critically, Netanyahu will want to know what Trump plans to do if diplomacy fails. Would the US take military action to prevent a nuclear Iran, or – more likely – would it give Israel the green light to act?
If so, Israel will need to know in advance what level of US military assistance to expect in carrying out such a strike and what kind of defensive umbrella Washington would provide in the event of Iranian retaliation – an attack likely to be far greater than the drone and missile attacks Iran launched at Israel in October and April that caused only minimal damage.
Right now, the Trump-Netanyahu meeting is being framed around short-term crises and diplomatic maneuvers. But the long-term challenge of Iran’s nuclear ambitions looms in the background, more urgent than ever.
If diplomacy is to be Trump’s chosen path, Netanyahu will push to ensure it is not just another drawn-out process that buys Iran more time. And if diplomacy fails, the real question remains: What then?