On Monday, February 19, a drone carrying explosives struck a field near Arbel in northern Israel. This is around 30 kilometers from the Lebanon border, which meant the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) had flown for some distance inside Israeli airspace.
Initial reports didn’t provide full details on where the drone had come from, and the IDF said initially that the circumstances of the incident were being investigated. Later in the day, there were airstrikes on Sidon in Lebanon.
There have been numerous drone attacks on Israel by Hezbollah since the Iranian-backed terrorist group began attacks on Israel on October 8. Hezbollah decided, with Iranian prodding, to join the Hamas attack that happened on October 7.
Hezbollah has a different type of arsenal than Hamas. First of all, it has more rockets. It also has a plethora of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and it has thousands of drones of different types. Hamas, by comparison, did not have nearly as many drones or ATGMs.
Hezbollah is also investing in more precision weapons. The Alma Center for Research and Education, which focuses on security threats in the north, described Hezbollah’s attempts at increased precision on February 18, saying: “The upgrade to precision capability also reached some of Hezbollah’s short-range rockets: the Grads with a diameter of 122 mm, the Fajr-Khaibar missiles, and the missile versions of the Fateh 110s in Hezbollah’s possession. It is highly likely that an increasing number of Hezbollah’s short-range Grad rockets and other rockets have become precise guided weapons.”
Hezbollah is advancing into the world of precision, as a kind of 'substitute for air force.'It is highly likely that an increasing number of Hezbollah's short-range Grad rockets and other rockets have become precise guided weapons. We estimate that Hezbollah has dozens of…
— Israel-Alma (@Israel_Alma_org) February 18, 2024
Along with the precision threat, the drone threat has also increased. Drones have been revealed as a central aspect of the future of warfare on battlefields from Iraq to Ukraine and in conflicts between countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Drones are also increasingly used by more countries; for instance, Turkey uses a plethora of drones, and Iran has exported drones around the Middle East.
Iran’s drone export has become so extensive that the drones being sent to Iran’s proxies look a lot like the method once used by the Soviets to export their AK-47s as a symbol of their role on the global stage. What that means is that the drone is now the new tool of the Iranian proxies.
Iranian proxies have been using drones in multiple arenas for years
For instance, Iranian proxies in Syria have used drones to attack US forces and also to target Israel since 2018. In Iraq, the Iranian-backed group Kataib Hezbollah used a drone to attack US forces in Jordan, killing three Americans on January 27. In addition, Iran has moved drones to Yemen. The Shahed 136 was first sent to Yemen in 2020 before being exported to Russia to help Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022.
The drone incident in northern Israel spotlights the growing role of these types of UAVs. Some Iranian drones, like the delta-wing design Shahed 136 are what are known as “loitering munitions,” meaning they explode on impact. These types of drones, when they have communications with their base, can “loiter” over a target.
The Iranian Shahed likely does not “loiter.” Rather, it flies a one-way mission like a cruise missile. This type of drone threat is different than the surveillance drone threat or the one posed by smaller quadcopters that have been converted to carry weapons. Quadcopters can often buzz around looking for targets. This can wreak havoc because they can go in any direction they want, posing a potential threat to a wider area.
As such, drones are more “bang for the buck” because with one drone, a terror group can threaten a large area. With thousands of drones, like Hezbollah is believed to have, the threat increases exponentially. Think of drones like pieces on a chessboard. While one might know all the pieces, the overall permutations of what can be done with them are endless.
The Iranian-backed drone threat is its own kind of threat. What that means is that Hezbollah, for instance, has built small airstrips for drones. For instance, Hezbollah launched drones at Israel on January 25, striking near Kfar Blum in northern Israel. Israel carried out airstrikes on an airstrip in Kilat Jaber on the same day.
The drone threat has slowly emerged in recent years. Iran began exporting drones to places like Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon and then sent them to proxies in Iraq. Hezbollah has been using drones for more than a decade. However, the types of drones have also changed over the years. Iran has moved from the types of drones that looked like “remotely piloted aircraft,” basically meaning large model planes that have radio control, to different types of drones that come from various “families” of drones built by large Iranian firms.
The Shahed 136, for instance, has now become a type of mass-produced drone. The move from having a handful of drones that can conduct surveillance to thousands of armed drones is what has shifted the role of this weapon system into the hands of groups like Hezbollah.
Drones are yet to be able to decide who wins a war
Nevertheless, there is some reason for optimism. Drones can conduct precision attacks and can harass large areas, but so far, they have not been shown to win wars. On the Ukrainian frontline, for instance, drones are used for a plethora of tasks, from attacking infantry and armored vehicles to helping artillery find targets. But they haven’t won the war for Russia or Ukraine.
Similarly, Hezbollah’s drone army is not equivalent to the proverbial “rook” or “queen” on the chessboard discussed above. The drones are still mid-rank in terms of their threat, and Iran’s proxies have not perfected drone swarms or other methods of use for them.