Mossad Director David Barnea, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) Director Ronen Bar, and outgoing IDF Intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Aharon Haliva on Thursday effectively issued their first unified public message since October 7. All three agencies provided an unusual update on their work via the journal of the Israeli Intelligence and Heritage Commemoration Center (IICC).
The Mossad wrote about its contribution to the war effort, not only in a general sense but giving specific examples, including that Mossad-made robots have helped the IDF penetrate and analyze Hamas tunnels in Gaza.
Further, the spy agency’s technological prowess has helped the IDF learn new methods for operating in nighttime battle situations and how to use artificial intelligence to analyze and select optimal battlefield strategies and options.
In addition, the Mossad wrote about its contribution to negotiations that led to the return of more than 80 hostages in November.
The article by the Mossad described Barnea’s negotiations with CIA Director William Burns and with top Qatari and Egyptian officials.
War's emotional toll
An interesting twist in the Shin Bet article described some of the unique emotional toll the war has taken on the organization.
According to the article, the organization is normally focused on eliminating terrorists, and the Israeli lives they are saving from those terrorists are usually nameless and lack a specific identity (since it is not known for sure which Israelis the terrorists could have killed at a given moment) even if they are very real.
But when the Shin Bet assisted directly in rescuing Ori Magidish, there was a face for the first time in a while.
The Shin Bet article described top senior operations officers hardened in the field and in headquarters being brought to tears when they brought Magidish to safety along with the IDF.
Further, the Shin Bet said it had given the entire defense apparatus crucial intelligence for how to defang and take apart Hamas within the early hours of the war, as it started to take into custody and interrogate Hamas captives.
Especially after the October 7 failure of the entire Israeli defense establishment, it was a moment that returned some of the dignity and confidence to the system.
The IDF Intelligence article focused on how the apparatus evolved after failures to get intelligence to operations units in real time during the Second Intifada in the 2000s and the Second Lebanon War of 2006.
According to IDF Intelligence, transformations made it ready to provide real-time intelligence to soldiers on the front via electronic interconnectedness and Units 8200, 504, and 9900 officers serving near the front.
Moreover, IDF Intelligence said it hit new highs in the volume and quality of intelligence targets that it now provides to operations units on a daily basis.
The articles gave little specifics about the failures of October 7 other than to admit to them and say all the organizations are reviewing issues for internal probes.
The IDF probe is due to be published in June; the time frame for the other probes is uncertain.