IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir did not wait long to put his stamp on the military, and in a flurry of decisions on Wednesday night, hours after entering the role, he made a variety of major and medium-level changes to the military’s command roster.
The Iran threat
1. Iran: Zamir publicly said that 2025 was the year of war focused on Gaza and Iran. This was an incredibly explicit and forceful statement. It should put Iran on notice that the clock is ticking on reaching a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear standoff.
And yet that statement was potentially less significant than the decision to close down a special full IDF command portfolio that has been part of the high command since 2020, specifically focused on Iran.
Why close down the Iran command when Tehran is only becoming a more serious and more immediate issue than it has ever been before?
Despite repeated requests, the IDF spokesperson’s office did not provide any comment or guidance.
However, The Jerusalem Post spoke to various defense sources who noted that closing such new commands is not infrequent. They noted that previously, there was a Depth Command for strategy that was closed and converted.
They said that military realities often change in radical ways.
However, in the post-October 7 world, they said that even if it is still necessary to have senior officers who spend all of their time thinking about strategy related to Iran, the IDF’s emphasis in terms of funding and human resources must return to combat fighters regarding border threats.
Given that in the last two years, new units focused on Iran have been created separately in IDF intelligence and in the air force, sources said that it might be less necessary to have a major-general and a full high command portfolio just focused on Iran strategy.
In any event, outgoing IDF Strategy and Iran Command chief Maj.-Gen. Eliezer Toledano (he is due to retire) had recommended to Zamir to close down the command.
2. Checking into closing the Northern Corps (separate from the Northern Command): The idea of the Northern Corps is to be ready to immediately command and vastly multiply mandatory and reservist forces in the North in the event of a conflict far beyond the expected capacity of what the Northern Command can manage on its own. The current commander, Maj. Gen. Dan Goldfus, was the key general who took over Khan Yunis and played many other critical roles in the war in Gaza.
The Northern Corps was closed before in 2006 by then-IDF chief Dan Halutz, but he was criticized for this heavily when the IDF failed to properly manage all of its land forces in the North during the Second Lebanon War. Shortly after Halutz was forced to resign, the Northern Corps was reopened.
With that background and so much action this year in the North, why close it now?
First of all, unlike the command focused on Iran, the fact that the issue is being reviewed means that Zamir views the situation in the North as dynamic.
Second, defense sources told the Post that after all of the action in Lebanon and Syria this year, and despite it being necessary to have security zones in both countries, Israel may actually need fewer forces focused on the North in the near future.
In other words, Hezbollah and Syria still pose a threat and may pose a larger threat in the coming years, but at this moment, Israel is more secure in the North than it has been in decades because of the military successes on both fronts.
It is unclear what would happen to Goldfus if the Northern Corps was closed.
3. Changing the Face of the IDF high command: Contrary to what some predicted, Zamir is not racing to quickly change all of the high command. That said, there are some major changes, including two key reversals from outgoing chief Herzi Halevi. Halevi passed over major-generals Tamir Yadai and Yani Asur for promotion.
Yadai retired for several months, only to now return, being promoted to IDF deputy chief.
Asur finished his last role as chief of the Human Resources Command in November and was on his way to retirement but was brought back by Zamir to be the crucial Southern Command chief.
Zamir’s promotion of Itzik Cohen to major-general probably would also have happened under Halevi, but his giving Cohen the critical Operation Command in his first position as a major-general might not have. Still, in this area, Zamir is keeping on current Operations Command chief Maj.-Gen. Oded Basiuk for some period of months to ease the transition. Basiuk was Halevi’s right-hand man, but has been in his position for around four years, so his retirement is not controversial.
Defense sources told the Post that the dozens of other appointments at all levels of command from brigadier-general to lieutenant-colonel throughout the military were likely close to identical to the list Halevi would have made.
Really, what happened was that in mid-December, Defense Minister Israel Katz froze all of Halevi’s appointments, and there was a glut of officers who were stuck without the ability to move on to their next standard expected roles.
In fact, sources noted that Zamir even promoted officers known as close to Halevi, something one would not expect if the new IDF chief was trying to redo all of the appointments.
Also, there were specific earlier officers who Katz had frozen the promotions of, who now were allowed to move forward.
It seems that Air Force Command chief Tomer Bar has been given a pass by Zamir for any October 7 failures as being systematic to the military and not personal to him.
The remaining key open question is intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Shlomi Binder.
Halevi cleared him of any major personal errors on October 7, which allowed him to ascend to his current post in August 2024.
But Zamir has ordered a full review of the probes concluded by Halevi by former major-general and Southern Command chief Sami Turgeman.
4. New October 7 probes: Turgeman ran the Southern Command from 2013 to 2015, such that he is seen as an expert in the area but far enough away from the invasion to not be viewed as responsible or have any conflict of interest.
Will Turgeman find that Binder and some other officers who have been promoted failed in their duties on October 7 and should lose their posts?
Another possibility is that Turgeman could look at October 7 with a wider lens, going beyond the IDF, especially since the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) report on the disaster is out now.
Finally, will Turgeman recommend any more radical changes to the IDF than what Halevi suggested after his probes?
One issue that remains very unclear is how long Turgeman will take with his review: a few months or much longer?
5. More tanks: Zamir comes from the Armored Corps. No one was surprised that he is restoring and even growing the power of the corps within the military.
Likewise, it was unsurprising that if Zamir is returning tank units cut by former IDF chief Aviv Kohavi during a time where the military was told to downsize, Zamir will also be returning field intelligence collection units that work directly with the tank corps.