Disputes between the air force, IDF Operations Command, and Intelligence Command heated up on Wednesday as new details came out about their different interactions and awareness of Hamas’s invasion plans on October 7.
In a report by Walla’s Amir Bohbot, later confirmed by the Jerusalem Post, it was revealed for the first time that then-senior IDF Operations Command official Shlomi Binder – who was promoted to major general and to lead the IDF Intelligence Command in August 2024 – passed on certain warnings to a top aide to Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar in the hours before the Hamas invasion.
Further it was revealed that IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi spoke to Bar directly at 6:36 a.m., 7 minutes after the Hamas attack started at 6:29 a.m., about the sudden Hamas attack.
Moreover, Bohbot’s report revealed that a top aide to Halevi sent out a text message to the top aides of all of the IDF high command, including the air force, at 7:05 a.m., that a war had started.
All of these details combine with a report in Yediot Ahronot from earlier in January that the air force had certain intelligence signs of a large potential rocket attack in the hours before Hamas launched around 3,000 rockets.
The Post has confirmed that the air force passed these details on to some portions of IDF intelligence.
Missed intelligence
IDF intelligence has not explained why they did not immediately pass these details on to the rest of the military, including Halevi, nor has the air force explained why it did not call an emergency meeting of the IDF high command in light of the findings.
Rather, until now, Bar has said that because Halevi did not invite him to join a middle-of-the-night call about intelligence signs of a possible Hamas move into Israel to kidnap some hostages, he had no idea until much later in the day that anything unusual might be happening.
These latest revelations combined together paint a different picture, which seems to indicate that Bar and the Air Force knew far more than they had let on to date, even if Bar was not on the call with Halevi in the middle of the night of October 7.
In other words, Bar had special air force intelligence about Hamas’s rocket unit in the middle of the night, was updated by a senior aide about the critical pre-war call in the hours before the invasion, and was given two significant warnings about the war within the first 30 minutes or so of the invasion.
Despite these warnings, the air force did not send all of its F-35, F-16, F-15, and other aircraft to the border in the 6:30-7:30 a.m. range, an act which might have been able to stop portions of Hamas’s second and third waves of the invasion.
Rather, the air force sent mainly drones and helicopters to assist with the defense of the border.
Sources noted to the Post that the air force did send three drones to the border immediately which were already in the air nearby.
Further, sources said that within two hours, there were dozens of air force platforms.
However, it has also previously been reported that the air force’s top aircraft, some of which got into the air fairly quickly, were assigned to stay in the air near critical infrastructure areas and not to help with the defense of the border.
Part of the controversy around this has been that the air force has said it had insufficient information in real time to know that the land invasion was so large that it should completely depart from its default plans and should have sent these aircraft immediately to the border.
The new revelations place this narrative into question and while the implication remains that the air force did not believe a mass invasion was taking place, there were many more signs which could have convinced them of such an invasion.
Prior to these revelations, the air force could claim that its errors were based merely on relying on IDF intelligence analysis and that it did not have enough information to form its own opinion and had been left out of the loop by Halevi. However, the newer picture suggests that, in spite of being given significant information, the air force merely made the same errors in understanding Hamas’s invasion, even after it had started, that others made.
Sources rejected this new narrative and said none of the new revelations are significant.
Rather, they say that if Halevi or the IDF Operations Command believed a major war was at hand, they would have issued orders to Bar to mobilize the air force for war.
The short call from Halevi did not raise significant information and was a moment of confusion for both Halevi and Bar. The text message from Halevi’s top aide is not viewed as carrying the actual weight of a major war, according to sources.
The latest information also brings unwanted attention to Binder as being more at the center of the IDF high command decisions than has been previously revealed.
Some political officials who are seeking to remodel the military with officials closer to their perceived political views have targeted Binder for removal, viewing him as “too close” to Halevi, who is resigning on March 6.
However, sources say that Binder was just operating under instructions from his superiors to pass on messages and that it was not until much later in the day that he or those around him had any clear picture of the massive size of Hamas’s invasion.