After the Syrian people, it is Turkey that has emerged as the biggest winner from the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December. As soon as Assad fled to Moscow, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan knew that fate had played into his hands.
As far back as March 2012, Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Assad. But within a few days of the regime’s overthrow it had reestablished its diplomatic representation in Syria, and Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, and the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, were in Damascus visiting Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the victorious rebel movement.
Turkey was able to share the joy and elation of the Syrian people because it had long supported HTS, as well as other Syrian opposition forces that aimed to replace Assad’s regime. With the ascent of HTS and its leader Julani, Erdogan knew that he was well placed to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s future governance and policies, and – he doubtless hoped – align them with Turkish strategic objectives.
Commercial benefits were also in Turkey’s sights. On December 27, Reuters quoted Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar as saying that Ankara aims to provide electricity to Syria. Bayraktar added that Turkey may also work with Syria’s new leadership on oil and natural gas, developing its energy infrastructure, including potential oil pipelines connecting the two countries.
Reporters from NPR said on December 27 that Turkish construction companies are poised to go into Syria, and that Turkish businesses are talking about moving factories across the border.
This would certainly create much needed jobs for Syrians, but they pointed out that before initiatives like this could occur, an effective infrastructure would be needed, such as consistent water and electricity supplies and efficient Internet services, and that these basics are not widely available at present.
In the new situation, Turkey would appear to have the upper hand over the fraught issue of the large Kurdish occupied region known as Rojava in the northeast of Syria, adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border. It occupies nearly 30% of the original sovereign Syria.
Exploring Erdogan's goals
Erdogan views the Kurdish occupied region as a security threat, because of its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), widely regarded as a terrorist organization, and believes it could inspire Kurdish separatists inside Turkey.
Ever since 2015, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have collaborated with the US-led coalition, leading ground operations that demolished the ISIS caliphate. This military achievement boosted the Kurdish standing in the US and revived their aspirations to achieve autonomy in the area they occupy, on the lines of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that enjoys a quasi-state status in Iraq.
Where Erdogan may miscalculate the extent of his increased influence within Syria is in relation to Julani’s intentions. Erdogan may be perceiving the HTS achievement as a traditional military coup aimed at projecting its leader to a position of autocratic power.
But ever since Assad’s fall, Julani has presented a moderate face to the world, consistently declaring that he intends to be as inclusive as possible in establishing Syria’s new governance. He has said several times that Kurds are “part of the Syrian homeland” while assuring the nation that “there will be no injustice”.
HOW WILL his sweet words play out against Turkey’s pivotal influence and resistance to Kurdish autonomy in Rojava? On December 17, The Wall Street Journal reported that US officials are growing increasingly worried that Turkey might soon launch a “full-scale incursion” into territory held by Syrian Kurds. They may have been reacting to Erdogan’s wide-ranging speech that day in which he declared: “As a nation, we cannot limit our horizons.”
He may be riding high at the moment, but he would do well to take note of the old saying: “Pride comes before a fall.” For the Kurds will not forget that something akin to the semi-autonomous situation of their compatriots in Iraq was actually offered to them by the Assad regime. In March 2015, the then-Syrian information minister announced that the government was considering recognizing Kurdish autonomy “within the law and constitution.”
Later, in September 2017, Syria’s then-foreign minister stated that Damascus would consider granting Kurds greater autonomy once ISIS was defeated. Events overtook these aspirations, and nothing of the sort materialized. But they might provide Julani with a template for a future accommodation with the Kurds within the constitution of a unified and restored Syrian state.
The pragmatic nature of politics means that Turkey’s augmented political and diplomatic standing has been immediately recognized by world leaders. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have reached out to Erdogan since the military coup.
On December 16, the EU instructed a senior diplomat to engage directly with the provisional government set up by HTS, while von der Leyen traveled to Ankara for a meeting with Erdogan. He came away from the discussion with €1 billion of EU cash to support the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and to assist in their repatriation.
The fall of the Syrian regime has been a major blow to Russian interests. President Vladimir Putin’s vital naval and air bases in Syria, assured under the Assad regime, have become vulnerable. He had big plans, both economic and political, for the Middle East, and the military bases in Syria were crucial to their achievement. He may need Erdogan’s support to retain them but there is always the chance that the Kremlin can conclude a deal with Syria’s new government.
According to Reuters, Russia has moved its naval vessels out to sea from the Tartus naval base, and drawn down equipment from its Khmeimim air base, but intends to keep both. With no indication that Putin is using Erdogan as a go-between, he is reported to have contacted Julani, requesting a renewal of the deals made with Assad.
An arrangement in 2015 gave Russia full control of the Khmeimim air base, while under the 2017 Tartus Naval Agreement, Russia was granted 49-year access to the Tartus naval base, with an automatic 25-year extension option.
According to an unnamed Syrian rebel official quoted by Reuters, the new Syrian government has not made a final decision on Russia’s request. This issue, like so much else about the future of Syria and the Syrian people, has yet to be resolved.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com