Last Tuesday, US President Donald Trump unexpectedly threw what at first sight seemed like a brilliant solution – the result of thinking outside the box – into the very complex Middle Eastern political arena.
Basically, what he offered was that after Israel finishes all its business in the Gaza Strip – namely, bringing all the hostages back home and defeating Hamas, and peace can be restored to the region – the US would take over the territory, which would be handed over to it by Israel.
This would take place before or after all the rubble of the destroyed remains of 70% of the buildings and infrastructures in the Strip is cleared, and either before or after all or most of the Gazans would be transferred voluntarily to alternative locations around the world.
The US would then undertake a project to create a magnificent tourist riviera in its place. Apparently, Israel, and not the US, would be responsible for security in the Gaza Strip, and the wealthy Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia would cover the project’s costs, though according to various statements by members of Trump’s staff – perhaps not.
According to all the public opinion polls about the reaction of the Israeli public to Trump’s bombshell, over 70% of Jewish Israelis favor the outline. The reason for such positive reactions in Israel is that it purports to permanently remove Hamas and the problematic Gazan population from Israel’s southwestern border, while providing a stable and lucrative foothold to the US in our region – right along our border.
The plan also raises hopes among those who dream of renewed Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, that this activity might be facilitated under American auspices, though Trump himself does not seem to consider Jewish settlement to be part of his vision.
Arguments against Trump's plan
THOSE WHO object to the outline do so for either ideological or practical reasons, or both.
One major argument is that though there might be quite a few Gazans who would be happy to leave the Strip and move elsewhere to start new lives (between the assumption of power by Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2007 until the outbreak of the current war in October 2023, 250-350,000 Gazans migrated from Gaza), the majority are unlikely to accept such a movement voluntarily.
According to international law, a voluntary transfer is acceptable, and there are numerous historical examples of such transfers having taken place in various regions in the world. However, an involuntary transfer is considered contrary to international law.
Another issue that a transfer, voluntary or involuntary, raises is to where around two million Gazans will actually go. Trump seems to believe that Sunni Egypt and Sunni Jordan are realistic potential destinations. The Gazan Palestinians, whether their ancestors came from Gaza, or were refugees created during the 1948/49 Arab-Israeli war, are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims.
However, both Egypt and Jordan reject out of hand the absorption of more than a handful of Gazan Palestinians, both because these two countries are already overcrowded, and because an injection of large numbers of Gazans into their territories is viewed by their leaders as a danger.
In the case of Egypt, it is because the current al-Sisi regime views the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, from whose midst Hamas emerged, as an enemy, while the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, since its creation in British Mandatory times, already contains a Palestinian majority, which, together with more recent refugees from Iraq and Syria, is viewed as a destabilizing factor.
From an Israeli perspective, the thought of the destabilization of its two neighbors with which it has written peace agreements and very long borders is not a welcome prospect.
Other predominantly Sunni states mentioned as potential hosts for a Gazan transfer, including Indonesia in Central Asia and Albania in Eastern Europe, are not really viewed as serious targets for the massive immigration of Gazan Palestinians.
West European and North American states, which might be favored by the potential transferees, also cannot be viewed as viable potential targets, because they are all suffering from strong anti-immigration sentiments when it comes to third world immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular.
Still, the problems with the plan are not only connected to the Gazan population concerned. The plan requires Israel to perform acts that it is not legally qualified to perform, or that are likely to clash with other policy goals.
Trump’s plan of turning the Gaza Strip into a riviera is based on Israel handing it over to US hands after reconquering it in its entirety, after having withdrawn from most of it because of the need to divert forces to other foci of the war, and now within the framework of the hostage agreement with Hamas. However, on the basis of international law, Israel does not own the Strip, and has no right to hand it over to anyone, besides the Palestinians.
In addition, the timing of Trump’s declaration about his plan is also problematic in terms of the return of the hostages. The timing was apparently designed to help Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sort out political difficulties with some of his coalition partners, by offering them something that might pacify those who are adamantly opposed to the war ending before Hamas is totally defeated.
However, the declaration came before the first round of the current hostage agreement has ended, and before the terms of the second round have been negotiated.
It is feared, among those circles in Israel who consider the return of the live hostages before they all perish to be the most important issue on Israel’s agenda at the moment, that if Hamas will reach the conclusion that Trump is serious about his transfer plans, it might decide not only to refuse to negotiate another round of the agreement, but might actually stop the implementation of the current round.
Though Netanyahu might not grieve over the premature ending of the hostage agreement at this stage, because it destabilizes his government, if we have learned anything from the poor physical condition of Eli Sharabi, Or Levy, and Ohad Ben Ami, who returned from captivity on Saturday, it is that the lives of the remaining live hostages are truly in danger. Hopefully, Netanyahu will be convinced of this as well.
If, in the final reckoning, Trump’s outline fails to materialize for all or part of the reasons mentioned, it might nevertheless end up having at least one welcome result, which is the opening of a new round of regional talks about innovative solutions to the Palestinian problem, and Middle East peace, which bypass all the failed efforts of the past.
The writer has held both academic and journalistic positions, and published articles on Zionism, European politics, current affairs, and Israeli politics. She has published several books, in Hebrew and English, the last of which was Israel’s Knesset Members: A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job.