In a nutshell, the Iranian regime wants an end to the sanctions that have crippled its economy while keeping an eventual nuclear arsenal very much in view, while US President Donald Trump is seeking an agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
To this end Iran and the US held talks in Oman on April 12. Afterward, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told state television they had taken place in a “productive, calm, and positive atmosphere.” Both parties agreed that a second round would take place one week later, which indeed they did on April 19, in the Omani Embassy in Rome. Araghchi told Iranian TV that the talks had been “constructive” – which probably means that Iran is getting its way on developing a civil nuclear power program while it waits for Trump to complete his term in the White House. Meanwhile, the parties agreed to meet again in the coming week.
Trump would no doubt assert that the talks are going well because he has warned Iran that the US would use military force if a deal is not reached. Moreover, despite Iran repeatedly saying it would not negotiate under pressure, even as preparations for the first meeting were in hand the US moved more warships and stealth bombers to the region and imposed more sanctions on individuals and companies supplying Iran with weaponry.
That first meeting was not precisely what Trump had requested in his letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He proposed face-to-face talks leading to a deal to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This, he asserted, would avert possible military strikes by the US and Israel. However, Khamenei authorized only indirect discussions between the parties.
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a cabinet meeting on March 30, confirmed that in reply to Trump’s letter Iran had rejected face-to-face talks. However, he revealed, he had written that “the road to indirect negotiation is left open.”
That is how the meeting was organized. Al-Monitor reports that it took place in a luxury hotel in Muscat. According to Iranian spokesman Esmail Baghael, each delegation had its separate room, and messages were exchanged via Oman’s foreign minister.
The whole process went well until a mischievous gremlin intervened, causing a tempest in a teapot – or, as the British have it, a storm in a teacup.
When, after nearly three hours, the indirect talks ended, the delegations left their separate rooms and, as chance would have it, met on the way out. The two delegation heads – Araghchi and Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steven Witkoff – came face-to-face, and chatted briefly.
“It was very normal,” said Araghchi. “When we were leaving, the two groups ran into each other and we spoke for a few minutes... we have always respected diplomatic politeness while encountering American diplomats.”
However when news of the encounter reached Iran, hardliners were appalled. Hamid Rasaei, an Iranian MP, reminded Araghchi that the supreme leader had authorized indirect talks only.
“Mr Araghchi, you had permission for indirect negotiations,” he declared. “This was not a normal encounter at all. You could have left the place later... and not meet.”
The face-to-face exchange was 'limited'
Other hardline commentators viewed the direct contact as potentially undermining Iran’s negotiating position.
The Iranian government, seeking to downplay the incident, emphasized how limited the face-to-face exchange had been, with no photographs taken. State-affiliated media outlets largely echoed this view of the affair. The fact that there has been no official statement from Khamenei, no censure or public reprimand, indicates his tacit agreement that the encounter should not affect the continuation of the negotiations.
This episode, together with a variety of other factors, indicates that Iran is extremely keen to come to an agreement with the US and be free of the heavy burden of sanctions that has crippled its economy for years, particularly those targeting oil exports and financial institutions. The consequential currency devaluation and inflation have eroded public purchasing power, while oil price volatility has heavily reduced government revenues.
Domestic instability is another burden the regime has had to cope with. The country has seen repeated waves of unrest, first over the deteriorating economic situation, and most recently after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, following her arrest by the morality police for wearing her hijab “incorrectly.” These widespread protests demonstrate the regime’s declining legitimacy among its own population. The government may believe that a deal with the US that lifts the sanctions would improve domestic conditions and reduce the risk of more unrest.
Iran is clearly in a weakened state compared with the recent past. It spent decades building an empire of satellites, funding and arming them – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and countless jihadist militias. Most have been severely depleted in the past few years by Israeli and Western action, and Iran’s influence, once based on its militarized outreach, has been much reduced. At the same time Iran’s economic difficulties have limited its ability to fund them.
THESE AND related factors go some way toward explaining why, despite his long-standing resistance to negotiations with the US, Khamenei has allowed the current talks to take place. He has consistently placed a high priority on regime survival, and has a track record of permitting diplomacy as a tactic. A major precedent was the negotiations back in 2015 leading to the original nuclear deal, concluded with then-US president Barack Obama in the lead. Khamenei regards negotiation as an occasional tactical necessity, not as a strategic shift of Iran’s fundamental purposes, which remain the destruction of Israel and the spread of Shi’ite Islam across the whole world.
Khamenei often delegates negotiations to elected officials (e.g., the president or foreign minister), while keeping a critical distance. This allows the regime to test the waters diplomatically without appearing weak. It also allows him to blame failures on negotiators, should talks collapse. The regime is thus able to claim any deal was done on Iranian terms, not under Western pressure.
In short, Khamenei allows talks when the regime is under existential pressure, when he can control and frame them, and when he can avoid blame if talks fail, or claim success if they work.
The current rounds of negotiations with the US are not signs of a change of heart on the part of the Iranian regime or its supreme leader. They are a calculated survival tactic.
Accordingly, not much credence can be placed on any agreement Iran might make to abandon its decades-long pursuit of a nuclear arsenal. As long as that regime survives, it will not abandon its cardinal objective – or the means to achieve it.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.