Remember the “three noes of Khartoum,” for too long one of the organizing principles of the Middle East? Now, meet the five noes of Tokyo.
The three noes of Khartoum refer to the resolution that came out of an Arab League summit in August 1967, shortly after the Six Day War, as Israel was – in Moshe Dayan’s memorable phrase – ”waiting for a telephone call” from Arab leaders: No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.
The five noes of Tokyo refer to the principles that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined to govern the post-Israel-Hamas war situation in Gaza. These principles were laid down during a G-7 meeting in Tokyo in November.
Here are the principles: No to the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza; no to the reoccupation of Gaza; no to the reduction of the area/land of Gaza; no to security threats to Israel from Gaza; no to the blockade of Gaza.
Since these five points were unveiled, they have been repeated numerous times and in different ways by officials in the US administration, from US President Joe Biden downwards.
In addition to the five noes, however, the United States has also made clear that it hopes to see a role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza after the war. Vice President Kamala Harris stated this at a conference in Dubai earlier this month. After repeating the five noes of Tokyo, she said, “‘We want to see a unified Gaza and West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.”
The PA security forces must be strengthened to eventually assume security responsibilities in Gaza, she said. “The Palestinian Authority must be revitalized, driven by the will of the Palestinian people, which will allow them to benefit from the rule of law and a transparent, responsible government. Eventually, this revitalized Palestinian Authority must have the capacity to govern Gaza as well as the West Bank.”
And therein lies the crux of the disagreement that burst into the open over the last few days between the vision America has for a post-war Gaza and what Israel wants to see there “the day after.”
“I greatly appreciate the American support for destroying Hamas and returning our hostages,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Tuesday, highlighting the dispute.
“Yes, there is disagreement about ‘the day after Hamas,’ and I hope that we will reach an agreement here as well. I would like to clarify my position: I will not allow Israel to repeat the mistake of Oslo. After the great sacrifice of our civilians and our soldiers, I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism, support terrorism, and finance terrorism. Gaza will be neither Hamastan nor Fatahstan.”
In other words, Netanyahu is ruling out any role for the PA in post-war Gaza. But what does he want to see there? What is Israel’s vision? With the exception of saying that Israel will insist that it has ultimate security responsibility over the Gaza Strip in any post-war scenario, much as it has ultimate security responsibility over Judea and Samaria today, Jerusalem has not put forward any post-war plan for Gaza.
IT IS into this vacuum that Likud MK and former ambassador to the UN Danny Danon stepped this week, presenting a five-point plan for the “day after.” Danon stressed that this plan was drawn up in consultations with other MKs, both from the coalition and the opposition, and with former members of the National Security Council and the security establishment, but was not the government’s plan.
While Netanyahu has not signed off on it, Danon – a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee – said the prime minister is aware of the ideas. Like the five noes of Tokyo, this plan also has five points.
“People around the world are always complaining to us that we say what we don’t want – that we don’t want the Palestinian Authority in Gaza – but not what we do want. We are presenting these principles as a basis for discussion so that when the world says we need to talk about the ‘day after,’ this is it.”
Danon said that while both Israel and the Arab countries in the region are reluctant to talk about what happens after the war while the war is raging, the American and European mindsets are different.
“They want to look at the long term, so we have to be prepared and not wait for them to bring us ideas,” he said.
Demilitarize the Gaza Strip
THE PLAN’S first principle is the complete and full demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, something Danon characterized as cleansing the area of terrorist elements, arms, and infrastructure.
He said, echoing Netanyahu, that during the demilitarization and afterward, Israel will reserve the right to act to prevent the terrorist infrastructure from being rebuilt.
After the demilitarization, the force that will be in charge of policing Gaza will only have light arms and nothing that could pose a threat to Israel. This principle is aligned with one of those put forth by the Americans: “No threat to Israel’s security from Gaza.”
Creating a 3 kilometer buffer zone in Gaza
The second principle, however, does conflict with one of the US’s stated principles: “No to the reduction of the area/land of Gaza.” Danon’s second principle calls for carving out a 3-km. buffer zone inside Gaza, along the border with Israel.
This will be a zone where no one is permitted to enter. Danon said this is one of the lessons that Israel needed to learn from violent protests that intermittently took part along the fence over the years, including one in 2021 in which a rioter rushed the barrier and shot through a hole in a concrete wall at a Border Patrol sniper, who later died of his injuries.
Danon said that Israel will supervise and enforce this no-go zone from the outside.
Have international, Israeli personnel guard the Rafah border crossing
The third principle is to upgrade the border crossing at Rafah and have it administered by an international force with Israeli representatives present.
The need for a new regimen at Rafah is a result of Egypt’s failure to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza.
Although Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took action against the tunnels soon after he came to power in 2014, including flooding them with seawater, this neither destroyed all the smuggling tunnels from Sinai into Gaza nor dealt with smuggling that was happening above ground.
One question that needs to be addressed is how Hamas was able to build up its massive arsenal of weapons even with an Israeli naval blockade of Gaza in place for the last 15 years – one for which Jerusalem received abundant international criticism. Much of this, according to one source, was smuggled overland by simply bribing Egyptian officials at the Gaza border crossing.
If the border crossing at Rafah is not upgraded to prevent the smuggling of arms, then any talk of demilitarizing Gaza is useless, Danon said.
Let Gazan Palestinians leave the Gaza Strip if they want
THE FOURTH principle is one that Danon first raised in a controversial op-ed he wrote with Yesh Atid MK Ram Ben-Barak in The Wall Street Journal last month that called for enabling those Gazans who want to leave to find refuge in other countries.
“This point calls for making it possible for those who want to leave Gaza to work and live in other countries to do so,” Danon said, adding that this will be incumbent on the willingness of the Gaza residents to leave voluntarily and of the readiness of third countries to take them in.
Danon said this is far from the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, and would only include those who want to go abroad. He said that this would benefit Gaza’s economy because, as is done in many countries around the world, Gazans would send money back home that would help the local economy and the development of Gaza.
“The possibility of them being able to leave will make the ability to rebuild Gaza easier and more sustainable,” he said.
This plan would necessitate getting visas from third countries willing to take in a limited number of Palestinians and help from the international community to both pay the host countries and provide an initial stipend to those interested in relocating.
Asked how he responds to those who claim that this is population transfer in a different guise, Danon – pointing to the wars in Syria and Ukraine – said that whenever there are wars, people leave and seek better futures elsewhere.
Furthermore, no one would be forcing anyone to leave, but only making it possible for those who would like to do so.
Danon said that the most logical absorbing countries would be Islamic or Arabic-speaking states. He said that since his article was published, he has received favorable responses from the representatives of some countries, mainly because they stand to benefit financially from being paid to take in the refugees.
Although he would not say which countries have shown an interest, he said they were mainly in Africa and South America.
The initiative for this has to come from the international community, he said, adding that it needed to be presented as something that will benefit the Palestinians and the long-term development of Gaza.
Danon said that already before the war a robust black-market business flourished getting Palestinians from Gaza to go to Turkey, via Cairo, and then from there to relocate in third countries. He said “thousands” of people have done this and have had to pay exorbitant amounts to agents and smugglers.
Financial rehabilitation without terrorism and incitement
The plan’s final principle states that the financial rehabilitation of Gaza should be contingent upon efforts to distance the population from terror and incitement.
Danon envisions an international framework, involving countries from the region, to collaboratively rebuild Gaza. Priority will be given to areas where there is a willingness to embrace “‘universal values” and promote education against terrorism. Under this plan, Gaza would be divided into different areas, and the rate of investment in each area would depend on efforts to uphold these values.
Danon is sketchy on who will administer Gaza during this period, saying it will be done by some “international mandate” that includes countries in the region. He said that this type of arrangement would only be for an interim period of some five to seven years until local leadership would emerge that could take over.
Like Netanyahu, he, too, sees no role for the PA as currently configured, something very much at odds with Washington’s vision of the “day after.”
Reminded that the US still sees the PA as a viable alternative, he commented that this is only because they don’t see anything else out there; it is either the PA or Hamas.
The hope, admittedly a long shot, is that in the Gaza reconstruction process, something else may emerge.•