With most civilians moved at lightning speed, Is the US still opposed to a Rafah op.? - analysis

The great Rafah conundrum just may have been resolved in one fell swoop, in a way that has the potential to restore US-Israel relations.

 Displaced Palestinians prepare to evacuate a tent camp, after Israeli forces launched a ground and air operation in the eastern part of Rafah, amid ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 11, 2024.  (photo credit: REUTERS/Hussam Al Masri)
Displaced Palestinians prepare to evacuate a tent camp, after Israeli forces launched a ground and air operation in the eastern part of Rafah, amid ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 11, 2024.
(photo credit: REUTERS/Hussam Al Masri)

For several months now, there has been a heated debate between the US and Israel about whether it would take four weeks (Israel’s view) or four months (the US’s view) to evacuate the Palestinian civilians taking refuge in Rafah so that the IDF could operate there – an estimated 1.2 to 1.4 million people.

Another heated debate was regarding whether that sheer volume of civilians in such a tiny area could be moved without a mass loss of civilian life; Israel wagered “yes,” and the US said “no.”

The IDF resolved this debate on Monday in its announcement that it had moved somewhere between two-thirds to 80% of the Palestinian civilian population out of Rafah – with a minimal number of casualties – in under two weeks.This was the first shocking swing of fate, due largely to extraordinary IDF achievements.

If the American objections to Rafah were specifically about harm to civilians or the mobility of civilians, their objections did not come to pass.

 IDF troops operating in Rafah, May 18, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
IDF troops operating in Rafah, May 18, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

If those reasons led Washington to threaten an offensive arms embargo against Israel, then perhaps that threat can now be removed.

The great Rafah conundrum just may have been resolved in one fell swoop, in a way that has the potential to restore US-Israel relations to where they were a few months ago – shoulder to shoulder against terror, Hamas, and Iran.

This would all work, except there are a few other shocking swings of fate in the opposite direction.

For Israel, a major reason to go into Rafah, other than to take apart Hamas’s remaining four battalions, was to secure the release of potentially dozens of hostages being held there. Another was to potentially corner Hamas Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar, who the IDF has said fled there from Khan Yunis in December.

IDF mum on hostages, Sinwar

So far, the military had nothing to say at all about either goal. It seemed even less confident about Sinwar’s location – now concentrated largely to the entire enclave – more so than at anytime since October.

The IDF also seemed to think that the rest of the Hamas high command took note of the assassination of Marwan Issa and is hiding better.

There is always the chance that a surprise operation is in the works, that tomorrow or the next day there will be a breakthrough in the locations of the hostages or Sinwar.

Also, there still will be likely some heavier fighting in Rafah going forward. But, it also seems that much of Rafah’s four battalions may have faded into the civilian population and fled with them to fight another day.

If so, all 24 of Gaza’s battalions will be taken apart and Hamas will have no place in Gaza to congregate as a public military ruler, and yet Israel will still be much farther from getting the hostages back or from eliminating Hamas. And Hamas is so very patient in its pursuit to return to power.

‘Rafah’ was not a magic word that would end the war, but it was supposed to produce major results that would greatly pressure Hamas, tilting some of the diplomacy questions in Israel’s favor.

To date, it seems that much less has been achieved than expected – possibly because Israel was so focused on getting the civilians out, even without checking them, as long as they were not openly armed.

And if Israel wants to continue military pressure to get the hostages back and find Sinwar, might it still be in a fight with Washington, which may just want the war to end, regardless of whether the hostages are returned beforehand?

Years from now, this might be called the Rafah whiplash – for two opposite shocks which may simultaneously leave observers heavily impressed by the IDF’s professionalism but deeply disappointed with the overall bottom line on achieving the war aims.