The attention of nearly the entire country is on the fight over blame for October 7, which pits Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against the IDF camp.
Netanyahu has tried to blame the majority of the disaster on failed IDF intelligence, imagination, and slow mobilization to repel Hamas.
The IDF – explicitly or implicitly – placed significant blame on Netanyahu for advocating a national security doctrine that Hamas could be contained, for promoting paying the group off with Qatari funds, and for harming the IDF’s actual and perceived readiness – Hamas perceived the IDF as weaker – with his judicial reform legislation push.
But, all of this has missed a major additional player in the October 7 disaster: the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).
To date, there has been almost zero scrutiny of the organization, compared to the harrowing beating the IDF has received.
Only one Shin Bet official involved in the failure publicly resigned (his identity was kept classified per the law, but his role in southern security was disclosed).
In contrast, the military chiefs of intelligence, intelligence analysis, southern intelligence, Unit 8200, and others have all resigned long ago over their roles.
Whereas Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi announced on January 21 that he will step down on March 6, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar implied that he is not planning to resign anytime soon.
Bar did take responsibility for his role in the October 7 failure in a general way in the fall of 2023, but given that his term is not up until October 2026, he could still stay on for another year or longer, and resign before the end of his term to showcase responsibility.
If there is any vague time frame as to when Bar would resign, the earliest seems to be if and when Israel and Hamas complete the deal that would return all of the hostages – not just those in phase one.
So, when will Bar resign if phases two and three never happen or are indefinitely delayed – assuming that phase one is completed, which has now become questionable?
And, if there had been heavy public pressure on Halevi to resign for months before he made his announcement, with Defense Minister Israel Katz even taking concrete moves to try to push him out the door, there have been no similar moves against Bar.
Until now.
Now, Netanyahu is reportedly demanding that Bar provide the Shin Bet’s full October 7 report to him – no later than this Saturday.
The Jerusalem Post queried the agency. The Shin Bet did not deny the demand.
THE TRUTH is that, behind the scenes, Netanyahu and some of his supporters tried to pressure Bar to resign, but he is a harder target than Halevi, since the Shin Bet, by law, operates in the shadows.
If Katz could use freezing appointments of specific military officers to embarrass and pressure Halevi, no one ever hears about any operations carried out by named operatives in the Shin Bet other than by the chief himself, a position that is changed every five years.
This latest attack of Netanyahu on Bar restarted when the government held a hearing about whether to establish a state commission of inquiry on October 7.
Netanyahu, who is trying to keep such an inquiry at bay as long as possible, only held the hearing to check a box that the issue is even being considered. This was in light of a petition to the High Court of Justice demanding that it be.
Bar wanted to present arguments to the cabinet in favor of such an inquiry. When Netanyahu blocked him from attending the hearing, he sent a letter to the prime minister advocating for a state inquiry. A copy of the letter was leaked to the media.
Seemingly in response to the letter, Netanyahu demanded that the Shin Bet produce its own October 7 report, as if to both remind Bar that he can be held accountable and to preempt any possible later attempts to blame the prime minister – by first blaming the security agency.
'M' slated as next Shin Bet chief?
It seems Netanyahu’s team leaked to Walla’s Barak Ravid that “M”, who recently joined the hostage negotiation team on behalf of the Shin Bet, may be slated to be the next head of the agency, in a symbolic nod to Bar’s replacement.
This is a far cry from actually forcing Bar out, but each of these moves is part of a not-so-thinly veiled threat to the chief that he will need to resign at some point, and the more he presses on Netanyahu, the sooner that resignation might be.
Certainly, once the Shin Bet’s October 7 report is out – including Bar’s failure to heed the intelligence signs of Hamas’s plans seriously enough – it will be much harder for him to stay in charge.
With Halevi out on March 6, once Netanyahu has Bar out, the prime minister will be the last man standing from the key officials involved in both the October 7 failure as well as the post-October 7 world.