The story of IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and October 7 is an independent tragedy in and of itself.
Until October 7, Halevi was viewed not only as a highly successful IDF intelligence chief and southern command chief but as a special forces star who had risked his life countless times in several different enemy territory areas.
One former superior commander, former IDF intelligence chief Aharon Zeevi Farkash, had called Halevi innovative, daring, and willing to challenge his commanders to accomplish dangerous and complex missions.
In 2008-2009, the IDF high command had to hold back Halevi and then IDF southern command chief Yoav Gallant from continuing the invasion of Gaza when they and some other officers wanted to complete the invasion, including going into Rafah, having already invaded northern Gaza and Khan Yunis.
Yet October 7 will forever stain his legacy, and one can see it churn his insides when he speaks to groups privately or publicly about the tragedy and his role in it.
Prior to October 7, Halevi had a certain swagger that tends to go with almost anyone who reaches the pinnacle of a powerful military.
That swagger has been gone now for a long time, and while there is still some pride in the achievements against Iran, Hezbollah, Syria’s army, and Hamas after October 7, it has been replaced by a heavy weariness that covers him.
Many in the IDF are now quoting the line from the Passover Seder about “every generation” being obligated to see itself as if it was part of the Exodus from Egypt and bringing it into the context of October 7 as: 'Every future generation must see themselves as if they were attacked on Oct. 7.’
This is a warning for future generations that Israel’s enemies have not stopped thinking they can wipe out the Jewish state, even as the IDF’s power is at new highs and Israel has six normalization deals with formerly hostile countries.
Halevi's legacy marked after almost 40 years of service
But it is also a mark that almost 40 years of heroic service for the country might be relegated to a footnote for Halevi to become known as the IDF chief who had the worst invasion since the Yom Kippur War happened on his watch.
Around 3:00 a.m. on October 7 when Halevi was woken up to get updates about some signs of a potential small-scale Hamas penetration, only a few hours before what turned out to be a much more massive invasion, he wrote to himself “we cannot convince ourselves that this is nothing.”
As he saw it, he took a stringent position about how to view the signs that morning, in light of the unanimous view of IDF and Shin Bet intelligence that there was no immediate threat and possibly no threat at all.
He even issued specific actions to take to have more surveillance available and to learn more about the situation.
He is highly frustrated to be blamed for a number of things that others in the IDF knew about but had not told him that fateful evening, as well as to be given special blame for a deep misunderstanding of Hamas, which enveloped basically all Israeli political and defense officials for around a decade.
Halevi's early resignation from this role
However, his actions, looking back, fell far short and led to his resignation 10 months early, with the last IDF chief resigning early, which occurred almost 20 years after the Second Lebanon War.
In a bizarre coincidence or twist of fate, having no idea what was in store for him, at Halevi’s inauguration speech in January 2023, he stunned many by citing former IDF chief David Elazar as his model to follow.
Elazar was forced to resign after the Agranat Commission assigned him significant blame for the IDF being unprepared for Egypt’s surprise attack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Tying himself to an IDF chief who resigned in disgrace after failing to prevent what was the worst tragedy in Israel’s history up until that point seemed to make no sense at the time, but in hindsight, it appeared to be strangely prophetic.
Lt.-Col. (ret.) Yuval Rochmilovitz, who had been Halevi’s commander in the elite Sayeret Matkal Special Forces when Halevi was a junior officer in the mid-1990s, told me that Halevi picked Elazar as his example to follow “because you don’t get to choose your circumstances, and you don’t get to choose your era. You can be the IDF chief during a quiet time and do well when circumstances are favorable, and there is no war.
Or you have Elazar, who had the job during one of the most threatening and hardest wars for Israel.” Like with Elazar, with Halevi, “I see the capability. Elazar understood the significance of the moment, and he succeeded in very hard and traumatic conditions for Israel, but Elazar brought victory.”
Over time, historians have put more blame on Israel’s political leaders and less on Elazar.
Despite the October 7 failure and criticisms that he should have resigned around June 2024 after the Rafah invasion, Halevi, during the war, has been credited by many for daring decisions leading to successful invasions of northern Gaza/Gaza City, Khan Yunis/mid-southern Gaza and eventually Rafah/deep southern Gaza, routing Hezbollah, destroying much of Syria’s long-range missiles, air force, and chemical weapons, and staring down Iran twice.
Halevi clearly cares deeply about his legacy and, at some point, will give a full public narrative to try to balance what he sees as a lopsided view of him.
What will historians say about Halevi 50 years from now, and will another IDF chief cite him as an example?