Is there another way with Israel?
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, January 29
One might argue that one of the unforeseen benefits of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation was that it threw into question the notion of relying solely on force to resolve the conflict. Neither the numerous wars nor the various forms of resistance have effectively achieved their goals. It is now more crucial than ever to voice certain truths, even if they may seem harsh, accusatory, or unsettling to those accustomed to familiar narratives and sentiments.
The immense Palestinian suffering must not continue unchecked, nor should the hardships of the Lebanese and other populations burdened by the exploitation of their cause. The situation under Trump’s leadership has only worsened, increasing the likelihood of disasters, displacement, and even acts of genocide.
We must acknowledge that bridging the gaps that disadvantage us – Israel’s international relationships with influential world powers, its technical advancements, nuclear capabilities, and its political and social structure, which can navigate internal contradictions even amidst war – will be impossible, both in the near and distant future. Furthermore, our societies have no desire for conflicts whose primary function has diverged from serving Palestinian interests.
Take Syria, for example, a nation once championing warfare and rhetorical grandstanding, now distancing itself as both people and government from such ideologies. This is not to suggest that Israel poses no problem – certainly not. But it does imply the need for alternative strategies to address the issue that do not resort to violence or endanger peace.
History offers insights into major conflicts, providing potential pathways to exit the war mindset and perhaps even influence Israel toward moderation, rekindling the diminished moderate forces weakened by the pervasive culture of violence and militarization. This approach could reinvigorate the possibility of a two-state solution, a prospect that once rallied over two-thirds of Israeli society during the Oslo Accords.
France and Germany’s historical trajectory offers a pertinent illustration. They faced each other in wars, including the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 – where Germany’s victory led to the humiliation of France and the inception of German unity – and during World War I, which saw Germany’s defeat and the articulation of the Versailles Treaty’s severe terms, cited as a factor in the rise of Nazism.
Yet, after World War II, despite the shame of occupation, France and Europe, under leaders like François Mitterrand, embraced German unification within a European framework, laying the foundations for the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro.
Similarly, the chronicles of conflict between Japan and Korea, with the former’s occupation of the latter from 1910 to 1945, saw unimaginable atrocities. Despite longstanding grievances, it took only 20 years post-occupation for relations to normalize, although challenges remain, particularly over reparations. Nevertheless, trade and partnerships in the economic, military, and security sectors endure.
The Anglo-Irish discord, dating back to the mid-17th century with Cromwell’s Protestant conquest and subsequent settlements, eventually transitioned from a violent independence war (1919–1921) to the 1998 Northern Ireland settlement that balanced power to appease both Catholics and Protestants, maintaining their respective affiliations.
India’s partition from Pakistan in 1947 led to catastrophic civil strife, displacing millions and claiming countless lives. The subsequent Indo-Pakistani wars highlight ongoing disputes, most prominently over Kashmir. Yet, diplomatic dialogues and trade interactions persist, emphasizing attempts at conciliation.
The Arab-Israeli conflicts are neither unique nor the most egregious examples of war. Perhaps the solution lies in emulating European strategies akin to Mitterrand’s vision, where the European Union served to contain and mitigate perceived threats from future German aggression. – Hazem Saghieh
Behind Hamas’s claims of victory
Al-Arab, London, January 31
In the second round of prisoner exchanges between Israel and Hamas, Hamas orchestrated a media spectacle to project the notion that it remains undefeated following the recent conflict. For much of the world’s populace, particularly the Arab community, displaying dignity, pride, courage, and resilience in the face of profound pain and loss is crucial.
However, this media display, insinuating that Hamas retains its strength and popularity by showcasing its mechanisms, its distributed members, and the congregation of supporters in the aftermath of the Israeli operations in Gaza, muddies the waters of progress.
With Hamas positioned prominently in governance, the process of reconstruction is hindered or potentially stalled, providing a rationale that aligns with the Israeli Right’s narrative, sustaining conflict, and deterring investors from considering involvement in rebuilding efforts.
Militarily, Mousa Abu Marzook, a leading Hamas figure, remarked candidly in an Al-Arabiya interview that “what transpired was not a war between two parties and two military forces, but rather an extermination campaign.” This raises an enduring question: how can one claim victory amidst annihilation? The scope of the devastation is national, not confined to villages like Deir Yassin, Kafr Qasim, or Tantura, where the number of fatalities was in the dozens, not the tens of thousands as witnessed in Gaza. Did past massacres result in victory? Consider that.
Meanwhile, criticisms persist against Palestinian leadership concerning the Oslo Accords. Yet, the Gaza agreement is even less substantive than Oslo, which encompassed the full homeland, liberating significant prisoners and lands, enabling the return of over half a million refugees, all accomplished without bloodshed. True victors liberate, reclaim refugees, and win battles, not lose them, as exemplified by the subsequent reoccupation of Gaza despite its complete liberation.
Furthermore, political analysts highlight clauses in the Gaza agreement facilitating the departure of 1,500 wounded individuals with families, implying the withdrawal of Qassam militants from Gaza.
Hamas inherently understands that its governance in Gaza is untenable and lacking international support, evidenced by the Rafah crossing’s management, free of Hamas control, compounded by humanitarian fallout from the Oct. 7 conflict and geopolitical tensions resulting from US President Donald Trump’s proposals to relocate Gazans to Egypt and Jordan – a stance met with staunch Egyptian-Jordanian rejection, straining relations with the US.
The Arab region is unwilling to sustain Hamas’s rule in Gaza due to ramifications on both Palestine and its neighbors’ regional security. Hamas’s claimed victory extends beyond rhetoric, seeking to fortify itself and evade future national accountability for crises it has precipitated for its people and allies, such as with Qatar, which visibly distanced itself, as shown in the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister’s statements during a Paris interview with Israeli media.
Similarly, Syria, recently recovering from turmoil, has not engaged with Hamas representatives; the Syrian administration insists Palestinian relations be conducted through their embassy in Damascus, excluding faction representatives like Hamas.
Meanwhile, Iran, an ally, is preoccupied with internal losses, focused on instigating unrest in Syria while safeguarding its regime and nuclear ambitions amidst a historic period of instability.
Hamas, with limited allied nations and militias for support, faces vulnerability without them, contrasting [with] the Palestine Liberation Organization, which boasts legitimacy from extensive global diplomatic networks, independent of any singular axis or ideology. Unlike Hamas, the PLO’s credibility endures despite geopolitical shifts, illustrated by the endurance of its representation following the Soviet Union’s collapse and Saddam Hussein’s downfall – highlighting a profound paradox. – Aws Abo Ata
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.