Over the last three months, Israel has been increasingly focused on southern Syria and the new Syrian government that emerged after the fall of the Assad regime.
Israeli officials have accused Ahmed al-Sharaa of being a jihadist, and they have frequently issued warnings to his government. Some of the warnings relate to Israeli claims that Israel will defend the Druze in southern Syria.
While supporting groups like the Druze can be a positive development, is it possible that weakening the new Syrian government or preventing it from securing areas in Dara’a near the Golan border could backfire?
Israel’s Syria policy appears to be maturing and taking shape. During the Assad regime, Israel engaged in what was called the “war between the wars” campaign. This included numerous airstrikes designed to prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria.
The weakness of the Assad regime enabled Iran and Iranian-backed groups, such as Hezbollah, to increase their role in Syria. This was particularly a problem after 2018 when Hezbollah began to operate near the Golan border, the Syrian regime returned to this area, and the southern Syria rebels were defeated.
One might think that from Israel’s point of view, the collapse of the Assad regime would be seen as a positive development because now, Iran and its proxies cannot take root in Syria.
Initially, Israeli officials took credit for the fall of the regime. Israel had inflicted such significant blows on Hezbollah in September and November that the group was unable to aid the Assad regime when Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham launched an offensive from Idlib in late November. The offensive led to the fall of Aleppo, and then Homs and Hama, and the collapse of the regime in two weeks of fighting.
However, Israel appears to have quickly tacked from a sense that the removal of the regime was a positive development to concerns that the new government in Damascus is little better. The messaging has been clear from the prime minister, defense minister, and foreign minister. Israel is focused on demilitarization in southern Syria and also focusing on potential support for the Druze and Kurds.
A report this week noted that the IDF released footage on Wednesday of 22 IAF jets attacking dozens of targets in Syria, which took place on Monday. According to the report, around 60 munitions were used in the large raid. As the Post reported, among the targets were radars and detection equipment used to assess aerial intelligence, headquarters, and military sites that contained weapons and equipment of the former Syrian regime.
THIS WAS one of many raids aimed at defanging southern Syria. The Syrian regime had maintained posts near the Golan; some of them were established on small hills and used by the regime for intelligence gathering.
Some of these sites date back to the 1970s. Others were reportedly used over the years by other groups and countries, including Russia.
It’s worth recalling that back in 2018 when the Syrian regime returned to the Golan border, reports indicated the Iranians were expected to remain at least 40 km. away from the border. This did not pan out.
The Iranians and their proxies attempted to threaten Israel from southern Syria. They also sought to destabilize Jordan using the drug trade.
What is the lesson learned from the era of the Syrian civil war and the period from 2018 to 2024 near the Golan?A weak Syrian regime led to a power vacuum near the Golan, increasing security threats. A weak Syrian regime led to the hollowing out of Syria, allowing bad actors to enter.
Will other groups attempt to control the area?
Israel has seen the same thing happen in the northern West Bank, Gaza, and southern Lebanon. When states are weak, enemies will enter. The question today is whether a policy of demilitarization in southern Syria will prevent the new authorities in Damascus from establishing control over southern Syria.
If they cannot control the Dara’a governorate, for instance, then it is possible that other groups may enter the area. This is not a theoretical question. In the days of the Syrian civil war, there was an ISIS affiliate in this area called Khalid ibn al-Walid Army that operated near the Golan and in the Yarmouk valley area.
The Syrian government today has many challenges on its plate. It isn’t keen to get into a conflict in Dara’a or near Quneitra across from the Golan. It is busy dealing with a crisis in Latakia and also working out deals with the Druze and the Syrian Democratic Forces.
After those deals, it will have to deal with the Turkish-backed SNA, which has already caused it a headache by carrying out a massacre in Latakia. Dara’a may be the last of its concerns.
The southern Syrian rebel factions and their leaders such as Ahmed al-Awda have long experience dealing with the area of Dara’a. However, the past shows that nefarious actors can enter areas where there is a vacuum of power.
Israel’s policies near the Golan could backfire. Airstrikes create an illusion of security. Gaza should be a lesson that airstrikes do not lead to security. Enemies can be weakened to some extent, but in the end, chaos on the other side of the border tends to lead to endless security challenges.