Regional and international delegations are converging on Syria to meet Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the new de facto leader of the country’s administration.
The unprecedented acceptance of a non-state actor – one with jihadist credentials – assuming power in a strategically significant state like Syria has drawn widespread attention.
Many observers assert these developments establish a new paradigm for governance and perception of Islamist factions. Some analysts contend that those who emerged from Idlib and elsewhere represent a “third generation” of the jihadist movement. These newcomers allegedly demonstrate pragmatism, moderation, and capacity for pluralistic governance.
Julani has yet to articulate any policy positions that alarm regional or international stakeholders or Syrian ethnic and sectarian constituencies. He advocates for an inclusive Syria.
He has distanced himself from comparisons to Afghanistan’s governance model, citing fundamental societal and cultural distinctions. He emphasizes that Afghanistan’s tribal structure differs from Syria’s social fabric, where unilateral dominance is unfeasible. He promotes a comprehensive social contract ensuring sustainable security, endorses women’s education, and demonstrates this commitment by appointing female technocrats to key positions, including the central bank governorship.
Current developments may not trigger immediate concerns, yet questions persist about implementing this idealistic – perhaps utopian – vision for Syria’s future. Historical precedent underscores the profound challenges inherent in political transitions, particularly following prolonged authoritarian rule and institutional breakdown. Such eras breed ethnic and sectarian tensions requiring sustained legislative and judicial reform, marking a decisive break from the previous regime.
Some policy experts suggest that institutionalizing coexistence in Syria requires a new constitution enshrining pluralism and protecting minority rights. Others advocate for structural reforms in governance, specifically a federal system. However, federalization could potentially catalyze territorial fragmentation, particularly given sovereignty disputes with neighboring states and existing separatist initiatives.
In broader terms, forecasting Syria’s trajectory remains problematic given the ambiguous status of non-state armed actors and the disposition of state military assets and personnel.
Security stabilization represents a prerequisite for forward progress. Without it, any political process remains vulnerable to armed factions operating outside state authority. Economic recovery – the Syrian population’s primary concern – demands security, stability, and an environment conducive to foreign investment.
Syria’s future trajectory
Indisputably, Syria’s future trajectory depends not only on the new administration’s domestic policies but also on regional and international diplomatic alignments. Syria’s long estrangement from Arab diplomatic frameworks, attributable to well-documented factors, periodically transformed it into an Iranian proxy within the Arab sphere. While previous divergent Arab positions prevented a unified approach to reintegrating Syria, current circumstances potentially offer an opportunity for both Syrian realignment and regional stabilization.
Notably, Julani’s ideological foundation and background in Salafi jihadism have not undergone fundamental transformation – suggesting otherwise reflects unrealistic optimism. Consequently, Arab states must avoid previous strategic miscalculations and prevent Syria from falling under alternative regional hegemony replacing Iran’s previous dominance over Syrian policy during Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
A critical consideration remains: exchanging Ba’athist authoritarianism for religious authoritarianism proves untenable. While Julani may represent a more sophisticated iteration of religious governance compared to previous implementations by similar groups, this does not guarantee acceptance of modern democratic institutions. His pursuit of international legitimacy generates numerous commitments and concessions, some appearing impractical in the near term.
THIS CONTEXT highlights the role of Arab states, whose positions on Syria’s rapid developments remain diverse. Saudi Arabia’s swift and multifaceted engagement stands out, including political, economic, humanitarian, and energy initiatives in the emerging Syrian framework, compensating for other Arab stakeholders’ absence.
For Saudi Arabia, the strategic calculus extends beyond reintegrating Syria – both state and society – into Arab frameworks or undermining regional rivals through diplomatic rather than confrontational means.
It reflects Saudi Arabia’s emerging role as a regional power broker capable of shaping strategic equations and alliances aligned with its interests and commensurate with its strategic weight.
It demonstrates a capacity for engaging diverse regional actors, even those historically misaligned with current Saudi strategic orientation, primarily because the reformed Saudi state presents itself as a model for transformation, proactively engaging even Salafi jihadist entities.
This suggests Saudi Arabia has developed sufficient strategic confidence to promote change externally, not merely domestically.
Given current dynamics, understanding Syria’s future trajectory requires monitoring its relationship with Riyadh.
The new Syrian leadership’s inaugural foreign visit to the kingdom met with notable diplomatic warmth, carries revealing implications. It indicates both this administration’s potential alignment with Saudi reform models and Saudi Arabia’s strategic interest in reconstructing a Syrian state that enhances regional security and stability, diverging from expansionist agendas that have destabilized the region, its populations, and states.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.