The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria represented a major geopolitical defeat for Iran, and Syria’s interim government has taken decisive steps to curtail whatever hard power Iran still possessed within the country.
In an interview published by the London-based Asharq al-Awsat on December 20, Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated that his overthrow of Assad had “set the Iranian project in the region back by 40 years.”
In February he said on television that he intends to distance Syria from Iranian influence, and he denounced Iranian proxies as a “strategic threat.” He emphasized that by removing Iranian militias and closing Syria to Iranian influence, he intended to achieve what diplomacy and external pressure had very obviously failed to do.
He was clearly signaling that he intended to realign Syria’s relations with much of the world and reduce Iranian influence in the region.
A sign that Iran’s powerful foothold in Syria was about to give way occurred on December 8. As the rebel HTS group overran and captured Damascus, the Iranian Embassy – hurriedly evacuated the previous day – was ransacked.
Armed gunmen stormed the building and vandalized it by smashing windows, looting offices, and tearing down portraits of prominent Iranian figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Qasem Soleimani, and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah. Video footage showed looters removing furniture and documents.
As a result, Iranian military and diplomatic personnel, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have largely withdrawn from Syria.
AS FOR Lebanon, Iran’s influence has been exercised primarily through Hezbollah, which it has supported financially and logistically ever since the organization was founded in the early 1980s, shortly after the 1979 Iranian revolution.
Since its ceasefire deal with Israel, Hezbollah has been constrained militarily and wounded politically, though not fatally.
The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, signed on November 26, 2024, expired more than two months ago. It was originally intended to last, with an agreed extension, until February 18, 2025.
That date has come and gone, but there has been no move to extend or renegotiate the deal. It appears to remain in effect by mutual agreement, but with no renewed legal basis.
Though Hezbollah’s capacity to operate independently is increasingly constrained, it remains a significant entity in Lebanon’s political landscape.
Acknowledging as much, Joseph Khalil Aoun, the country’s newly elected president, has with caution begun to reassert the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. On April 14, in a TV interview on Al Jazeera, he broached the delicate topic of disarming Hezbollah.
With the real danger of civil strife in mind, he declared that demilitarizing Hezbollah would be achieved through negotiation, as part of a national defense strategy, and not through force.
Disempowering Hezbollah means disempowering Iran, about which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cannot be too pleased.
Hezbollah’s morale has collapsed following its substantial military defeat during the 2024 conflict with Israel. Reflecting this, on April 10 a Hezbollah official informed Reuters that the organization was willing to discuss disarmament. Its proviso is Israel’s withdrawal from five contested areas in southern Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli military strikes.
It was during his inaugural address to parliament on January 9 that Aoun first pledged to ensure that “weapons will only be in the hands of the state,” a position he has endorsed several times since.
Proceeding with caution, he has announced that implementation of the principle will depend on a “bilateral dialogue” between himself and Hezbollah.
Even so, Aoun said the Lebanese army has been confiscating weapons and dismantling unauthorized military facilities in southern Lebanon, as outlined in the ceasefire agreement.
The future of Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s future, and with it the extent of Iran’s influence within Lebanon, will probably depend on its ability to adapt to the evolving political environment, engage in constructive dialogue with the state, and redefine its role within Lebanon’s national framework.
The days of Iran’s dominant influence within the Lebanese state by way of its overmighty proxy are over. As indeed are Iran’s use of Assad’s Syria as a military hub and convenient transit route for supplying Hezbollah with weaponry with which to attack northern Israel.
Syria’s interim President Sharaa, who led the Sunni militia HTS for eight years, has no time for Shi’ite Hezbollah. On March 16, Syria’s defense ministry accused Hezbollah of abducting and killing three Syrian soldiers near the Lebanese border.
According to the ministry, Hezbollah ambushed the soldiers, took them into Lebanese territory, and executed them. Hezbollah denied any involvement in the incident.
Regardless, Syrian forces shelled areas in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, and the Lebanese army returned fire. After two days of clashes, with casualties on both sides, Lebanon and Syria agreed to a ceasefire. The agreement was negotiated directly between the defense ministries of the two countries and did not involve Hezbollah.
Follow-up diplomatic exchanges led to discussions on border demarcation and security coordination, aiming to rebuild trust and stabilize bilateral relations. These, too, were conducted without the participation of Hezbollah. Clearly, its influence on events has been much diminished. Iran’s proxy is being sidelined.
It was on April 14, five weeks after Lebanon and Syria agreed on the ceasefire that ended cross-border clashes, that Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam visited Sharaa.
“This visit will open a new page in the course of relations between the two countries,” said Salam.
Beyond the talk of mutual respect and restoring trust and good neighborliness, the two leaders also agreed to cooperate in the economic field, signing off on creating a ministerial committee to follow up with issues of common interest.
The whole episode served to demonstrate growing confidence on the part of the Lebanese, whose delegates seemed no longer in thrall to Hezbollah. Nor did Iranian interests feature in Sharaa’s effort to establish good relations with his Lebanon neighbor.
DESPITE THESE setbacks, Iran is attempting to establish a connection with post-revolution Syria. So far, the new Syrian administration has shown little enthusiasm for opening bilateral relations with Iran. It is clearly favoring an independent and regionally integrated approach.
Despite its loss of status, Hezbollah retains a good deal of political clout, especially among the Shi’ite population. But many in Lebanon blame Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, for dragging the country into regional conflicts and provoking Israeli retaliation.
As the Lebanese state grows stronger and Hezbollah weaker, Iran can see its power in Lebanon slipping away. Meanwhile Assad’s successor as Syria’s president is clearly not inclined to allow Iran much influence in his postrevolutionary country.
The old order is changing.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.